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Comments and Casenotes
Equitable Enforcement Of Implied Restrictions
On The Use Of Land
Turner v. Brocato'

The parties plaintiff were prior purchasers from a common grantor of building lots in an expensive Baltimore subdivision known as "Poplar Hill". Each had taken his lot
subject to use restrictions which, inter alia, limited construction to one single-family dwelling house. The common
grantor reserved the right, in those deeds which fully recited the restrictions, to waive some of them, and to except
all of them from his remaining land outside of the immediate section of the subdivision of which the land being
conveyed was a part. The grantor recorded a plat upon
purchase in 1927 showing sections A and B as subdivided
with section C still vacant. After three years he made a
revised plat, showing no sections and marking off 12 additional lots in the once-vacant section C. This plat was not
recorded, but was referred to in deeds which were recorded.
Restrictions were imposed in deeds to these new lots by
reference to prior deeds of lots in sections A and B. At the
extreme western end of section C was a 500 x 100 foot finger
of land bounded on the west by Falls road, and contiguous
to the rest of the tract for only 150 feet on its northeastern
side; this finger was not subdivided on either of the plats.
The southernmost third was sold without restrictions to a
storekeeper who converted it into a parking lot. The middle
third remained in the grantor. The northern 150 feet were
purchased by defendants in 1953 from the original grantee,
clear of any express restrictions; they started excavation,
intending to erect a cleaning establishment. The plaintiffs
brought a bill praying for a declaration that defendants'
land was part of the common grantor's Poplar Hill development and, as such, restricted to non-commercial use. Their
claim was that the defendants, as subsequent purchasers
with notice, took subject to the restrictions which the
grantor had, by express deed or necessary implication, put
upon his own land as a reciprocal burden to induce plaintiffs
to buy the restricted lots. The trial court dismissed the bill
on the ground that the parties plaintiff had failed to meet
their burden of showing that the grantor intended to im1206 Md. 336, 111 A. 2d 855 (1955).
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pose the restrictions for the common benefit of all Poplar
Hill landowners, hence, that the benefits of these restrictions were merely personal to the grantor and could in no
way burden his power to convey any of his remaining land
free and clear.
Speaking through Hammond, J., the Court of Appeals
in reversing the trial court, Collins, J., dissenting, Held:
(1) Plaintiffs having met their burden of showing a general
plan of development, the rule of evidence favoring freedom
of the land must accede to the rule favoring the intent of
the parties; (2) Since the common grantor sold the restricted lots with intent to benefit all landowners in the
Poplar Hill development, from his sales to prior purchasers
there arose an implied reciprocal restriction, binding upon
his remaining land, and enforceable against subsequent purchasers with notice; (3) The Statute of Frauds cannot bar
the enforcement of such implied restrictions; (4) The defendants, being thoroughly familiar with the physical layout of Poplar Hill, were put on notice of the implied reciprocal restriction upon the common grantor's remaining
land from the deeds of record in which the grantor expressly restricted the lots sold to the parties plaintiff and
other prior-purchasing residents of Poplar Hill.
In attempting to determine what effect this case will
have upon future Maryland litigation on the restricted use
of land, two considerations are brought into focus: (1) this
is the first time the Court of Appeals has expressly followed
the doctrine of implied reciprocal restrictions; (2) in so
doing, the Court has, as indicated by Judge Collins' dissent,
raised some doubt as to some formerly well settled rules on
the burden of persuasion and on notice sufficient to bind
a purchaser.
THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE

SUIT AND THE

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

That restrictions on the use of land might be enforced
in equity was first recognized in the English case of Tulk v.
Moxhay.2 The decision went off not on grounds of real
property law but upon the old maxim that "equity does
what ought to be done". Lord Cottenham said that:
".... the question is, not whether the covenant runs
with the land, but whether a party shall be permitted
to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of
which he purchased."
'2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
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"... if there was a mere agreement and no covenant,
this Court would enforce it against a party purchasing
with notice of it; for if an equity is attached to the
property by the owner, no one purchasing with notice
of that equity can stand in a different situation from
the party from whom he purchased."3
As frequently happens when American courts try to
latch on to an English dictum, a good deal of confusion and
scholarly hair-splitting has issued out of this case.4 Does a
covenant for restricted use of land give rise to a mere contract right' specifically enforceable in equity against a purchaser with notice; or does it create an equitable negative
easement,6 an incorporeal property interest in the land of
the covenantor? The American courts have divided sharply
on the issue.7 So have the scholars. s With one exception,'
the Maryland cases have rested flatly on the property
theory, without analyzing the issue."°
'Ibid, 777, 778, 1144.
'The logical "ring-round-the-roses" into which one can get when trying
to wrestle with this case is illustrated by a note in 31 Harv. L. Rev. 876
(1918).
5See Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 Va.
L. Rev. 951, 973 (1942).
67 Ibid, 975.
Favoring the contract theory: Lewis v. Gollner, 129 N. Y. 227, 29 N. E.
81 (1891) ; Hall v. Solomon, 61 Conn. 476, 23 A. 876 (1892) ; Johnson v. Mt.
Baker Park Presbyterian Church, 113 Wash. 458, 194 P. 536 (1920) ;Friesen
v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930) ; McComb v. Hanly, 132
N. J. Eq. 182, 26 A. 2d 891 (1942). Favoring the easement notion: Sprague
v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 380, 100 N. E. 622 (1913) ; Flynn v. New York, W. & B.
R. Co., 218 N. Y. 140, 112 N. E. 913 (1916) ; Ham v. Massasoit Real Estate
Co., 42 R. I. 293, 107 A. 205 (1919) ; Hege v. Sellers, 241 N. C. 240, 84 S. E.
2d 892 (1954). That English cases have embraced the property theory:
see 3 TIFFANY, RiAT PRopErTY (3d ed., 1939), Secs. 861, 486 and 490.
8 See authorities footnoted in a note, Restrictions Against Occupancy EXistence of a General Plan, 8 Md. L. Rev. 307, 310 (1944).
9Levy v. Dundalk Co., 177 Md. 636, 646, 11 A. 2d 476 (1940).
10The process has been one of quotation and citation, completely removed,
until the present case, from the war of theories. The first case on the subject, Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 487, 494 (1870), quoted a Massachusetts
decision to determine the right as an easement. The next case, Halle v.
Newbold, 69 Md. 265, 269, 14 A. 662 (1888), quoted the Thruston case.
Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co., 70 Md. 493, 500, 17 A. 372 (1889), cited
both prior cases and introduced Tulk v. Mowhay, 8upra, n. 2, to the Maryland Reports with a long quotation, in support of ,the easement notion.
These cases became the citational backbone of later decisions. Judge Offutt,
In his monumental opinion of McKenrick v. Savings Bank, 174 Md. 118, 122,
197 A. 580 (1938), noted in 2 Md. L. Rev. 265 (1938), prior to briefing each
important Maryland decision on the subject, quoted the Thruston case as
setting the right in the nature of an easement. This opinion became the
guide to more recent cases. Schlicht v. Wengert, 178 Md. 629, 635, 15 A.
2d 911 (1940) ; Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480, 488, 41 A. 2d 479 (1945).
In Raney v. Tompkins, 197 Md. 98, 101, 78 A. 2d 183 (1951), the question
of the enforcement right was given such terse treatment as to suggest that
it was almost too stale for mention.
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Where, as in the instant case, one is confronted with
the broad problem of the prior purchaser's right to enforce
the burden against a subsequent purchaser from the common grantor, both the contract and property theories run
into serious logical obstacles to their application." In order
to keep the gravamen of the problem down to earth, one
writer has suggested that the most satisfactory solution is
to treat the prior purchaser's enforcement right as completely sui generis, as an equitable right enforceable in and
of itself, and not derived from any settled theory of property
or contract law.' 2 This eminently sensible idea was referred
to with favor by Judge Hammond in the present case. 13
Determination of the basis of the enforcement right becomes especially important when, as here, the particular
problem is the prior purchaser's right to enforce a restriction wholly implied against the land of a subsequent purchaser, i.e., where there is no deed of record in which the
common grantor expressly reciprocally bound his remaining land to the restrictions he imposed on the prior purchaser, or in which he directly imposed the same restrictions upon the land of the subsequent purchaser. If the enforcement right is in the nature of a negative easement
appurtenant to the prior purchaser's land against the servient land of the subsequent purchaser, this right must be
derived from an express grant in the earlier deed, whereby
the common grantor covenanted to bind his remaining land
or to insert like restrictions in later deeds. If, however, the
negative easement must be implied from an oral promise
of the grantor to restrict his remaining land, it is an oral
contract for the sale of an interest in land, unenforceable
under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds and falls under the
rule that all prior oral promises are merged into the deed. 4
On the other hand, if the enforcement right is one of
contract only, enforceable in equity against purchasers of
land affected by the contract right, it would still seem unenforceable under section 4 as an oral contract not capable
of performance within one year.'5 This difficulty could be
avoided, however, by the application of the English rule
that this section of the Statute does not apply to those
u See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (1952), Sec. 9.30, 424, et seq.; Reno,
op. cit., supra, n. 5, 973, et seq. See also CLARK, REAL COVENANTS (2d ed.,
1947), Ch. VI, 171, et seq.; TFANY, op. cit., supra, n. 7, Sec. 861.
2 AmEICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (1952), See. 9.30, 427.

'"206 Md. 336, 347, 111 A. 2d 855 (1955).
"Sprague v. Kimball; Ham v. Massasoit Real Estate Co.; Hege v. Sellers,
supra,n. 7; 38 Harv. L. Rev. 967 (1925).
'n38 Harv. L. Rev. 967, 970 (1925).
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bilateral contracts in which one side has been completely
performed within one year. 6
Finally, if the right is sui generis, the Statute is inapplicable.
It is difficult to quarrel with the Court's adoption of the
doctrine of implied reciprocal restrictions, as enunciated in
Sanborn v. McLean 7 and formulated in the American Law
of Property;S the doctrine is not an illogical or unreasonable extension of the Maryland law on equitable enforcement of restrictive covenants. 9 The Court's treatment of
the Statute of Frauds, however, is an entirely different
matter. As stated previously, Maryland has been a property theory state, as a simple matter of stare decisis2 ° In
the present case the Court, for the first time, went beyond
mere decisions and took a long look at the theoretical basis
of the suit. It had three predictable alternatives: stick with
the property theory and reject the Sanborn doctrine under
the Statute of Frauds; adopt the doctrine under the contract
theory, as New Jersey2 ' has done; declare the right sui
10Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitude8 in Land, 28 Va. L. Rev.
1067, 1094 (1942).
1233 Mich. 227, 206 N. W. 496 (1925). Other leading cases are La Fetra
v. Beveridge, 124 N. J. Eq. 24, 199 A. 70 (1938) and McComb v. Hanly,
supra, n. 7, but the enforcement of implied restrictions is not new: Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N. Y. 105 (1862) ; Schickhaus v. Sanford, 83
N. J. Eq. 454, 91 A. 878 (1914).
"ISupra, n. 12, Sec. 9.33.
"0This does not mean the extension was predictable. Cases of first impression in property law always have their unsettling effects. True, of the
thirty-odd cases on the subject of restrictions, few have held the restrictions enforceable. There have been some "tough" decisions: Wood v.
Stehrer, 119 Md. 143, 86 A. 128 (1912) ; Ringgold v. Denhardt, 136 Md. 136,
110 A. 2d 321 (1920). But, as stated in the present case, supra, n. 13, 353,
this history of non-enforcement "has been because of the facts, not the law".
The logic of the adoption is attested by a long string of dicta beginning
with Peabody Heights Co. v. Willson, 82 Md. 186, 199, 32 A. 386, 1077 (1895)
and culminating in McKenrick v. Savings Bank, supra, n. 10, 128, to the
effect that "if in such a case it appears that it was the intention of the
grantors that the restrictions were part of a uniform general scheme or
plan of development and use which should affect the land granted -and the
land retained alike, they may be enforced in equity, . . ." If this is true,
there is no reason why implied as well as express restrictions should not
be enforced, presuming the implication is clear. The reasonableness of the
adoption is reflected from present urban conditions. Attractive residential
areas are desirable enough, but they are hard to maintain, harder to create.
"Urban Renewal", Evening Sun (Baltimore), November 29, 30, December
1, 1955. Since public zoning is too vagrant for the job, the most sensible
way to stop the old routine of "blockbusting" Is to enforce clearly intended
private zoning arrangements. Where the neighborhood is plainly a restricted
residential area, there may be clever legal arguments against enforcing
implied restrictions, but there are no equitable ones.
20 Supra, n. 10.
2La
Fetra v. Beveridge, supra, n. 17. It has been suggested that Sanborn
did this, In view of the fact that It didn't even consider the Statute. This
suggestion is hard to square with the Court's repeated use of the phrase
"reciprocal negative easement". 2 AMEaOAN LAW OF PROPERTY (1952), Sec.
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generis, the Statute inapplicable and the doctrine in force.
The Court did none of these; it executed a back-door exit
by saying, "...
it would serve no good purpose to decide
the true, underlying . . . principle . . ., then quoted 23
some neatly edited Cardozo dicta to the effect that, even
though the right has developed into an equitable property
interest, its origin under Tulk v. Moxhay24 was contractual,25 and, for purposes of the Statute, its origin will determine its nature. Since the obvious purpose of the Court was
to adopt the Sanborn rule without letting the Statute get
in its way, it would certainly seem that the adoption of the
sui generis theory would have been a cleaner way of getting
the job done.2 6
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF PROOF

The basic essential of victory in any complainant's case
for the enforcement of land use restrictions is the massing
of proof sufficient to overcome a presumption in evidence
resolving all doubts in favor of the free, unrestricted use
of land. In Maryland, the "freedom presumption" has been
strictly enforced. 7
As a prerequisite to relief under this doctrine of implied
reciprocal restrictions, the enforcing party must prove:
first, his general right of enforcement based upon evidence
showing, (1) intent of the common grantor to develop the
land according to a general plan, (2) that such intent was
9.33, 432, suggests that the justification for ignoring the Statute may be
found in the fact that the Court was applying by implication only those
restrictions expressly recited in the prior purchaser's deed, which writing
would satisfy the Statute.
206 Md. 336, 347, 111 A. 2d 855 (1955).
23 Ibid.
242 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
2Whatever merits there may be to the contract theory, the conclusion
reached by Chief Judge Cardozo in Bristol v. Woodward, 251 N. Y. 275, 167
N. E. 441 (1929), that its birthplace was Tulk is clearly erroneous. Lord
Cottenham refused even to inquire whether there was an adequate remedy
at law, i.e., whether the covenants would run at law. Equity often does this
where real property rights are involved, but it always looks to the adequacy
of legal remedy before considering the specific performance of contracts.
Only in an eminent domain proceeding against restricted land where
the owners of benefited land seek compensation for their condemned benefit
will it have to be decided, once and for all time, whether the right is one
of property (requiring compensation) or one of contract (released by condemnation for impossibility of performance). Flynn v. New York, W. & B.
R. Co., 218 N. Y. 140, 112 N. E. 913 (1916) ; Friesen v. City of Glendale,

209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930) ; 2

AMERICAN LAW

OF PROPERTY

(1952),

Sec. 9.40.
2Wood v. Steher; Ringgold v. Denhardt, supra, n. 19; Sowers v. Holy
Nativity Church, 149 Md. 434, 131 A. 785 (1926) ; McKenrick v. Savings
Bank, 174 Md. 118, 197 A. 580 (1938) ; Schlicht v. Wengert, 178 Md. 629,
15 A. 2d 911 (1940) ; Matthews v. Kernewood, Inc., 184 Md. 297. 40 A. 2d
522 (1945).
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carried out, i.e., that the planned development exists, (3)
that the common grantor intended to include in this development the property against which enforcement is
sought; 28 second, his particular right to enforce these implied reciprocal restrictions based upon evidence showing
(1) that, knowing of this intent to develop, he relied" upon
oral representations by the common grantor that the remaining land would be bound reciprocally to the same restrictions expressly imposed in complainant's deed, or that
he would insert like restrictions in all subsequent deeds,
and (2) that the defendant purchased with at least constructive notice ° of the restrictions.
The rules governing the type of evidence that may be
used to establish these points are quite liberal. 1 Proof of
the grantor's intent to create a development is a question
of fact,8 2 which may be answered from one or more of three
types of evidence, depending on which the court may deem
most important: (1) express language in his deeds; (2) his
acts and statements in selling or trying to sell lots; (3)
"notice" evidence, e.g., uniformity of the restrictions in the
deeds, the physical appearance of the development, the
recording of a plat. Of course, once the evidence establishes the existence of a uniform housing development, the
complainant is well on his way to proving the intent to
restrict according to a plan; that is, for practical purposes,
proof of the grantor's intent and of the plan's existence are
virtually inseparable problems.
Turning to the present case, there was no doubt as to
the developer Charles Fenwick's intent to establish Poplar
Hill as a uniformly restricted residential area: the language
of the deeds, his recording of the first plat, his distribution
of copies of the second unrecorded plat and of lists of the
restrictions, his placing of a sign about the development on
' Rose v. Kenneseth Israel Congregation, 228 Minn. 240, 36 N. W. 2d
791 (1949).
2 Proof of reliance is necessary to any prior purchaser's case of enforcement under a general plan. Summers v. Beeler, 90 Md. 474, 481, 45 A. 19
(1899) ; Bristol v. Woodward. supra, n. 25; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
(1952), Sec. 9.30, 424, 426; comment, Equitable Servitude8 - The Running
of Covenant8 in Equity, 2 Md. L. Rev. 265, 275 (1938). There was no question about it in this case, so it is not discussed. Under Tallmadge v. East
River Bank, 26 N. Y. 105 (1862), it would have been enough to show that the
grantor displayed a plat as an inducement to sale.
a, Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N. W. 496 (1925) ; 3 TIFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (3d ed., 1939), Sec. 863, 492, cases cited in fn. 89. That
equity requires proof of notice before enforcing any restriction has been
accepted unequivocally since Tulk v. Moxhay, 8upra, n. 24.
8Bristol
v. Woodward, 8upra, n. 25; Sehllcht v. Wengert, 8upra, n. 27;
TIFFANY, Op. cit., supra, n. 30, See. 868.
a Summers v. Beeler, supra, n. 29, 482.
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the defendant's land, the "high class" look of the area - all
bore out this contention.
Yet, in dealing with his intent to include the defendants'
land in this development the Court did a startling thing.
At the very outset"3 of his opinion, Judge Hammond made
a finding that this land was a part of Poplar Hill, and went
on to hold later that:
"Here, the appellants have met the burden of proof
as to a general plan of development by clear and satisfactory evidence. This being so, the principle that
doubt must be resolved in favor of the alienability of
land, free and unfettered, does not control .... This rule
of construction bows always to the more fundamental
rule that wherever possible effect will
be given to an
4
ascertained intention of the parties."
The effect of this maneuver was to take the proof on "intent
to include" out from under the old "freedom presumption"
and to raise a presumption that the grantor intended to include in his general plan all platted land contiguous to lots
restricted. Since the platting of this finger of land with
the rest of the tract, the placing of the sign on defendants'
part of the finger, and the fact of its 150 foot abutment on
Poplar Hill lot No. 78 were the only bits of evidence favoring "intent to include", only under such a presumption
could these facts be allowed to overbalance contrary evidence of the commercial use of the southern part of the
finger, of the land's valuelessness as residential property,3 5
and of Fenwick's failure ever to subdivide or restrict the
finger. One is left with a question whether this application,
in fact at least, of two opposite presumptions to two dif206 Md. 336, 345, 111 A. 2d 855 (1955).
1bid, 352.
The entire finger rose away from Falls road at something like a thirty
degree angle; except for the surface it was solid rock. The parking lot to
the south had been created by excavation, which was the only way to make
the surface usable. While the excavation might permit commercial use, it
seems unlikely that, even if the entire area had been residential, anyone
would put up a house with its face right on the street and its back to a
thirty foot rock wall. Aside from that, the area was shown to be more
commercial than not. If land abutting restricted residential property becomes commercial in character, the restrictions will not be enforced if it is
apparent that the purpose of the general plan can no longer be accomplished.
Needle v. Clifton Realty Corp., 195 Md. 553, 73 A. 2d 895 (1950), noted In
13 Md. L. Rev. 219 (1953) ; 2 AmERicAN LAW OF PROPEMTY (1952), Sec. 9.39.
Since this was not discussed in the present case, it must 'be assumed that
the Court considered the facts inappropriate to the application of such a
rule, or that counsel for the defendants chose not to put it in issue, perhaps
on the consideration of Middleton Realty v. Roland Park, 197 Md. 87, 78 A.
2d 200 (1951).
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ferent but closely allied phases of the grantor's intent is to
be construed as creating a new rule of evidence.
This finding of the developer's intent raises the second
major problem of proof required of a complainant: that of
establishing, as a matter of law, that the defendant was on
constructive notice"0 of the restrictions. In Maryland one
is bound by every express encumbrance on his property
which he could have found in the records.-7 If the grantor
covenanted in a deed to a prior purchaser to restrict his
remaining land, any subsequent purchaser from him would
be bound by the restrictions imposed in the prior deed,
whether they were in his direct chain of title or not, assuming proper proof of a general plan. The Court of Appeals,
by permitting enforcement of restrictions wholly implied
against the present defendants, has carried record notice
one notch further. Even though a subsequent purchaser
be without actual knowledge of the restrictions, and though
he can find nothing of record expressly encumbering his
property, he is nevertheless bound by notice of express restrictions imposed by the grantor upon lots previously
deeded away under the general plan; because these restrictions, though they do not concern the subsequent purchaser's land, raise the implication that the grantor intended to restrict the entire development. This implication
of reciprocity is the core of the implied restriction doctrine.3 8 It is readily observed, then, that this doctrine, as
applied by the Court, supplies its own built-in record notice
mechanism, which will add to the burden of thorough title
searching. As a corollary to this mechanism, since it must
be determined whether the recorded restrictions on other
lots were imposed under a general plan so as to make conclusive the implication of reciprocity raised by them, a
subsequent purchaser is bound by the physical condition
39
of the neighborhood, as a matter of inquiry notice.
ISupra, n. 30.
Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 A. 216 (1915). A contrary rule confines notice to the direct chain of title. Buffalo Academy of The Sacred
Heart v. Boehm Bros., 267 N. Y. 242, 196 N. E. 42 (1935) ; 'hilbrick, Limits
of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 125, 173
(1944) ; note, 16 A. L. R. 1013. The Maryland rule only means that, as a
title searcher checks the description of a grantor's conveyances, he must go
on to check the body of the deed for such unusual items as restrictions.
Sanborn v. McLean, supra, n. 30; 2 AMEICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (1952),
Sec. 9.33, 431.
1 The courts in Sanborn and the instant case decided that the physical
condition of the neighborhood put the subsequent purchasers on notice to
go look at the record and find the restrictions. It has been suggested that
record notice binds one to go look at the land because, as a practical matter,
title searchers generally have little occasion to view the premises, and,
even if they do, the records come first. At any rate, the purchaser will be
bound, no matter at which end of the notice machine he starts first.
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However, the present case discloses two varieties of
notice: that of the existence of a general plan, and that of
the intended inclusion of defendants' property in that plan.
In neither the majority opinion nor the dissent was this
distinction drawn, but the easy proof of notice of the general plan was construed as notice of inclusion of defendants'
land thereunder. In other words, the burden was shifted
to defendants, once plaintiffs had shown notice of the general plan. This conclusion was inescapable, because the
same facts were determinate of both intent and notice. The
entire case for the plaintiffs on notice of inclusion of defendants' property in the general plan rested upon constructive
notice from the sign and record notice of the first plat with
the original deed to the grantor, Fenwick, both of which included the finger. It was not proved that any of the defendants actually saw a copy of the second, unrecorded plat;
the Court said they were put on inquiry notice of that plat
by references to it in the recorded deeds of prior purchasers.
But that is irrelevant, because even if they had seen it, it
would not have disclosed the finger as a subdivided, let
alone integrated, part of Poplar Hill. Inspection of the
premises showed only that it was contiguous on its eastern
boundary to a restricted lot, that it was located next to a
restricted development but in a commercial neighborhood,
that it was a topographical impossibility as a housing site,
that the southern part of the finger was used as a parking
lot. Though defendants' reasonableness could be no issue,
it seems incredible that they would knowingly have purchased a deed to litigation."
Judge Collins said in Matthews v. Kernewood, Inc.,4 1
"[I]mplied restrictions have never been favored by this
Court." Evidently this is no longer true. It is one thing to
enforce implied restrictions and quite another to favor
them. This case represents not just a sudden departure from
prior Maryland holdings;4 2 it is the most extreme decision
10This raises a question companion to the intent dilemma: is the Court's
treatment of notice to be construed as creating a new rule of law as to the
extent to which a purchaser may be bound? Even if the shifting of burdens
of proof does not create a new rule of evidence, is it nevertheless established
that, if notice of a general plan is proved, a subsequent purchaser is on
record notice of inclusion if his land was part of either/both the recorded
plat or/and the original deed to the common grantor from which the
general plan developed, regardless of other proofs that there was no notice,
actual or constructive, of inclusion?
184 Md. 297, 305, 40 A. 2d 522 (1945).
See supra, n. 27. See also two recent "liberal" decisions: Martin v.
Weinberg, 205 Md. 519, 109 A. 2d 576 (1954) ; Adams v. Parater, 206 Md.
224, 111 A. 2d 590 (1955).
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in the American law of implied restrictions. 48 The doctrine
is one of equitable relief; it would seem only just that enforcement of implied restrictions should be more difficult
than that of express. The enforcement should be strictly
limited to those cases in which the implication stands out
with all the unassailable prominence of a village church
spire - to those cases where the equities of the enforcing
party are weighty and clear. The basis for the doctrine is
a public policy favoring private zoning arrangements, which
are always more secure than public zoning ordinances.
But that policy must always be expected to stand beneath
the policy favoring unrestricted use of property by its
owner,44 when the two close in a conflict of doubts. This
is the first case to reverse that order.
ROGER

D.

REDDEN

The Right To Contest A Will
In Maryland
Fry v. Yeatman'
This caveat of a will was filed in the Orphans' Court of
Montgomery County by the sister of the testator. The
testator was survived by his widow, father, and mother his heirs at law in case of intestacy.2 By his will, which was
admitted to probate on November 25, 1952, his mother and
father were left nothing. Ten months later the father and
mother both died testate, the will of the mother completely
disinheriting her daughter, the caveatrix in this case, and
the will of the father leaving her a legacy of $100.00. This
CfC.Price v. Anderson, 318 Pa. 209, 56 A. 2d 215, 219 (1948), where it was
said that:
"But the mere fact that a grantor imposes restrictions on parts of a
tract which he sells does not raise any inference that he means thereby
to obligate himself to restrict the remainder of his property; in every
such case there must appear definite evidence of a purpose to bind the
remaining land, and that purpose must be clearly made known to the
grantees."
This approach to implied restrictions is manifest In Rose v. Kenneseth
Israel Congregation, 288 Minn. 240, 36 N. W. 2d 791 (1949) and Baederwood,
Inc. v. Moyer, 370 Pa. 35, 87 A. 2d 246 (1952). As to the general stinginess
of enforcement, see cases noted In 60 A. L. R. 1216, 144 A. L. R. 916.
"In 2 AMEWICAN LAW oF PRoPEaTY (1952), Sec. 9.29, 416, it is suggested
that restrictions should be favored on the ground that they actually heighten
alienability in a residential area. This does not answer the right of a
property owner to free use of his land.
-207 Md. 379, 114 A. 2d 621 (1955).
2Md. Code (1951), Art. 93, Secs. 132, 133, 136, Art. 46, Secs. 1, 2.

